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Pennsylvania
Last updated 08/25/2009
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Analysis prepared for the Foundation for Fair
Civil Justice by Shook, Hardy & Bacon
L.L.P |
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Liability |
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Joint and
Several |
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Economic |
Applies |
A statutory amendment
that would have limited joint and several
liability to certain instances (e.g.
misrepresentations, intentional torts) was struck
down in Deweese
v. Weaver, 880 A. 2d 54 (Commw. Ct.
2005), aff'd, DeWeese v. Cortes, 906 A. 2d 1193 (Pa.
2006) and Estate of Hicks v. Dana Corp.,
909 A.2d 298 (Pa. 2006), for
violating the single subject rule of the state
constitution.
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Non-Economic |
Applies |
See
above.
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Market
Share |
No |
Skipworth v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n,
690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting market share
liability).
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Defenses |
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Statute
of Repose |
In medical liability and
real property improvement cases only
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7-year statute of repose in
medical liability claims. The statute of
repose does not apply to foreign objects
unintentionally left in the body, nor does it
require a minor to commence an action prior to age
20.
40 Pa. Stat. Ann.
§ 1303.513.
12-year statute of repose
applicable to claims involving improvements to
real property.
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
5536; see also Columbia Gas of Pa., Inc. v.
Carl E. Baker, Inc., 667 A.2d 404 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (declaring statute to be
constitutional).
Generally, manufacturers
are not covered by the statute of repose in
actions for personal injuries.
Noll v. Harrisburg
Area YMCA, 643 A.2d 81 (Pa.
1994).
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Product
Misuse |
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A manufacturer is not
responsible for injuries due to abnormal use that
could not be reasonably foreseen or expected.
Brill v. Systems Resources, Inc., 592
A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Pegg v. General Motors
Corp., 391 A.2d 1074 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1978).
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Government
Contract |
Yes, by court
decision |
Pennsylvania recognizes a
government contractor defense in product liability
cases. See Mackey v. Maremont Corp.,
504 A.2d 908 (Pa. 1986); see also Beaver Valley
Power Co. v. National Eng’g & Contracting,
Co., 883 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1989); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115
(3d. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1082 (1986); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d. Cir. 1982); Price v.
Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
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Compliance
With Government Standards |
No |
Evidence that the product
complied with customary standards or industry
standards is usually inadmissible with respect to
the issue of defect. See Leaphart v.
Whiting Corp., 564 A.2d 165 (Super. Ct.
1989), review denied, 577 A.2d 890 (Pa.
1990); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528
A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987).
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Comparative
Negligence |
Yes,
modified |
A plaintiff may not
recover if his or her negligence is greater than
the causal negligence of the defendant or
defendants against whom recovery is sought.
42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §
7102. Comparative negligence is not a
defense in strict product liability cases.
Parks v. Allied Signal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327
(3d Cir. 1997).
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Assumption
of Risk |
No, in negligence actions,
but sometimes applied as “lack of
duty”
Yes, in strict product
liability actions |
Abolished unless preserved
by statute or in cases of express assumption of
risk. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver
Cty., 437 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981); see also
Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 394
A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978) (holding plaintiff hit by
baseball at ballpark could recover if invitor
diverted plaintiff's attention with eye catching
displays).
No duty/assumption of
risk: Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120
(Pa. 1983) (no duty to plaintiff who slipped on
ice in parking lot because danger was known and
obvious); Dilauro v. One Bala Ave. Ass’n,
615 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (plaintiff
assumed risk when going down stairs without use of
handrail).
Assumption of risk is a
defense in product defect cases if the plaintiff
knew and understood the specific danger and the
potential for serious injury and yet voluntarily
choose to encounter it. Davis v. Berwind
Corp., 690 A.2d 186 (Pa. 1997); Mackowick
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 575 A.2d 100 (Pa.
1990).
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Compensatory
Damages |
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Economic |
No
limit |
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Non-Economic |
No
limit |
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Is recovery for
medical monitoring permitted without physical
injury? |
Yes, cause of action |
Redland
Soccer Club, Inc., v. Dep’t of the Army,
696 A.2d 137, 145-48 (Pa. 1997). |
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Punitive Damages |
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Allowed |
Limited against health
care providers only |
Punitive damages against a
health care provider are limited to two times
compensatory damages, except in cases of
intentional misconduct.
40 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann.
§ 1303.505(d).
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Multiple awards for same
conduct |
No
limit |
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Award paid to
state |
No |
25% of punitive damages in
medical malpractice cases must be paid into the
Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error
Fund.
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 40,
§ 1303.505(e).
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Standard
used |
Preponderance of the
evidence |
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Procedures |
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Venue |
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Conducive to
Abuse |
Not
reported |
A
personal action against a corporation or similar
entity may be brought in and only in: (1)
the county where its registered office or
principal place of business is located; (2) a
county where it regularly conducts business; (3)
the county where the cause of action arose; (4) a
county where a transaction or occurrence took
place out of which the cause of action arose; or
(5) a county where the property or a part of the
property which is the subject matter of the action
is located provided that equitable relief is
sought with respect to the property. An action
regarding an insurance policy may be brought, in
addition to the above, in the county where the
insured property is located or where the plaintiff
resides in actions upon life, accident, health, or
disability, policies or fraternal benefit
certificates.
Pa. R. Civ. P.
2179(a).
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Class
Actions |
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Immediate right of appeal
from class certification? |
Discretionary |
Under Pennsylvania law, an
order certifying a class is appealable by
permission under Pa. R. App. P. 312. An
order denying class certification is a collateral
order which may be appealed of right under Pa. R.
App. P. 313. See Dunn v. Allegheny County
Prop. Assessment Appeals and Review Bd., 794
A.2d 416 (Commw. Ct. 2002), aff'd, 936
A.2d 487 (Pa. 2007); Foust v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 756 A.2d 112 (Commw. Ct. 2000),
review denied, 771 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 2001); Niemiec v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 721 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998).
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Evidence |
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Has the state adopted
Daubert, which requires the judge to
act as a "gatekeeper" against unreliable expert
testimony in civil actions?
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No |
Pennsylvania courts
continue to apply the Frye standard to
determine whether scientific evidence is
admissible. Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723
A.2d 162 (Pa. 1999). Subsequently, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a case in
which the trial court applied Daubert and,
in its review of the case, the Pennsylvania Court
of Appeals applied Frye. The Supreme
Court held that the expert’s testimony was
inadmissible under both Daubert and
Frye, stating that it would be
jurisprudentially unsound” to use the case to
resolve the conflict. Blum v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 764 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.
2000).
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Problem Jurisdictions |
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None Reported |
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