|
Liability |
|
Joint and Several |
|
Economic |
Limited |
Joint and several
liability is limited to where a defendant has: (1) been
found liable for intentional misrepresentation; (2) been
found liable for intentional tort (3) been held more
than 60% liable; (4) been held liable for environmental
hazards, or; (5) been held civilly liable as a result of
drunk driving. For purposes of apportioning liability,
persons who have settled can be assigned shares. 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 7102. |
|
Non-Economic |
Limited |
See above. |
|
Market
Share |
No |
Skipworth v. Lead Indus.
Ass’n, 690
A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting market share liability). |
|
Defenses |
|
Statute of Repose |
In medical liability and
real property improvement cases only |
Seven-year statute of
repose does not apply to foreign objects unintentionally
left in the body, nor does it require a minor to
commence an action prior to age twenty. Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 40, § 1303.513.
Twelve-year statute of
repose applicable to claims involving improvements to
real property. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5536.
Generally, manufacturers
are not covered by the statute of repose in actions for
personal injuries. Noll v. Harrisburg Area YMCA,
643 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1994). |
|
Product Misuse |
|
A manufacturer is not
responsible for injuries due to abnormal use that could
not be reasonably foreseen or expected. Brill v.
Systems Resources, Inc., 592 A.2d 1377 (Pa. 1991);
Peggs v. General Motors Corp., 391 A.2d 1074 (Pa.
1978). |
|
Government Contract |
Yes, by court decision |
Pennsylvania recognizes a
government contractor defense in product liability
cases. See Mackey v. Maremont Corp., 504 A.2d
908 (Pa. 1986); see also Beaver Valley Power Co. v.
National Eng’g & Contracting, Co., 883 F.2d 1210 (3d
Cir. 1989); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim,
769 F.2d 115 (3d. Cir. 1985); Brown v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d. Cir. 1982); Price
v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Pa. 1985). |
|
Compliance With Government Standards |
No |
Evidence that the product
complied with customary standards or industry standards
is usually inadmissible with respect to the issue of
defect. Leaphart v. Whiting Corp., 564 A.2d 165
(Pa. 1989); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528 A.2d
590 (Pa. 1987). |
|
Comparative Negligence |
Yes, modified |
A plaintiff may not
recover if his or her negligence is greater than the
causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against
whom recovery is sought.
42 Pa.
Stat. Ann.
§ 7102. Comparative negligence is not a defense in
strict product liability cases. Parks v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327 (3d Cir. 1997). |
|
Assumption of Risk |
No, in negligence
actions, but sometimes applied as “lack of duty”
Yes, in strict product
liability actions |
Abolished unless
preserved by statute or in cases of express assumption
of risk. Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver Cty., 427
A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1981); see also Jones v. Three Rivers
Management Corp., 394 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978) (holding
plaintiff hit by baseball at ballpark could recover if
invitor diverted plaintiffs attention with eye catching
displays).
No duty/assumption of
risk: Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 (Pa.
1983) (no duty to plaintiff who slipped on ice in
parking lot because danger was known and obvious);
Dilauro v. One Bala Avenue Ass’n, 615 A.2d 90 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (plaintiff assumed risk when going down
stairs without use of handrail).
Assumption of risk is a
defense in product defect cases if the plaintiff knew
and understood the specific danger and the potential for
serious injury and yet voluntarily choose to encounter
it. Davis v. Berwind Corp., 690 A.2d 186 (Pa.
1997); Mackowick v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 575
A.2d 100 (Pa. 1990). |
|
Compensatory Damages |
|
Economic |
No limit |
The Pennsylvania
Constitution prohibits caps on noneconomic damages. Pa.
Const. art. III § 18 (in no other cases shall the
General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for
injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons
or property, and in case of death from such injuries,
the right of action shall survive, and the General
Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions
shall be prosecuted”). |
|
Non-Economic |
No limit |
See above. |
|
Punitive Damages |
|
|
|
Allowed |
Limited against health
care providers only |
Punitive damages against
a health care provider are limited to two times
compensatory damages, except in cases of intentional
misconduct. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
tit. 40, § 1303.505. |
|
Multiple awards for same
conduct |
No limit |
|
|
Award paid to state |
No |
25% of punitive damages
in medical malpractice cases must be paid into the Care
Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Fund rather
than to the prevailing party. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40,
§ 1303.505(e). |
|
Standard
used |
Preponderance of the
evidence |
|
|
Procedures |
|
|
|
Venue |
|
|
|
Conducive to Abuse |
Not reported |
A
personal action against a corporation or similar entity
may be brought in and only in: (1) the county where its
registered office or principal place of business is
located; (2) a county where it regularly conducts
business; (3) the county where the cause of action
arose; (4) a county where a transaction or occurrence
took place out of which the cause of action arose; or
(5) a county where the property or a part of the
property which is the subject matter of the action is
located provided that equitable relief is sought with
respect to the property. An action regarding an
insurance policy may be brought, in addition to the
above, in the county where the insured property is
located or where the plaintiff resides in actions upon
life, accident, health, or disability, policies or
fraternal benefit certificates.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 2179(a). |
|
Class
Actions |
|
|
|
Immediate right of appeal
from class certification? |
Discretionary |
Under Pennsylvania law,
an order certifying a class is appealable by permission
under Pa. R. App. P. 312. An order denying class
certification is a collateral order which may be
appealed of right under Pa. R. App. P. 313. See Dunn
v. Allegheny County Property Assessment Appeals And
Review Board, 794 A.2d 416 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002);
Foust v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, 756 A.2d 112 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000);
Niemiec v. Allstate Insurance Co., 721 A.2d 807 (Pa.
Super. 1998). |
|
Evidence |
|
|
|
Adopted Daubert? |
No |
“Pennsylvania courts
continue to apply the Frye standard to determine
whether scientific evidence is admissible.”
Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1999).
Subsequently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a
case in which the trial court applied Daubert
and, in its review of the case, the Pennsylvania Court
of Appeals applied Frye. The Supreme Court held
that the expert’s testimony was inadmissible under both
Daubert and Frye, stating that it would be
jurisprudentially unsound” to use the case to resolve
the conflict. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical,
764 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. 2000). |
|
Problem Jurisdictions |
|
Philadelphia (Court of Common Pleas) |
|
|
